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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
is no evidence whether the defendant spouse had or had not appeared the case
must be remanded to determine that issue. Justice Frankfurter believed that
where there is no such evidence it must be presumed that the defendant spouse
failed to appear and that therefore the jurisdictional fact of domicile could be
collaterally attacked.
Janet McFarland
WRONGFUL DEATH-ACTION BY WIFE'S ADMINISTRATOR ALLOWED
THOUGH WIFE COULD NOT HAVE BROUGHT ACTION HAD SHE LIVED
Plaintiff, administrator of the estate of a woman who was killed by her
husband, sued the executor of the husband's estate under the Illinois Wrongful
Death Statute. Held: Even though the wife could not have maintained an action
in tort had she lived, because a wife cannot sue her husband in tort in Illinois, her
administrator can sue her husband's executor for wrongful death. Welch v. Davis,
410 IlL 130, 101 N. E. 2d 547 (1951).
At common law all civil actions for personal injuries abated with the death
of either the injured party or the wrongdoer. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493,
170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K. B. 1808); Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83 at 84, 138
N. E. 808 at 809 (1923). In 1846 the English adopted a wrongful death statute
known as Lord Campbell's Act (9 and 10 Vict, c. 93). It allowed an action for
the death of a person whenever the person himself could have sued for the injury
had he survived. Such a statute was enacted in New York. L 1847 c. 450, now
in N. Y. Decedent Estate Law §§130-134. Today every state has a similar statute.
Wrongful death statutes are not survival statutes giving a right of action for a
personal injury to the deceased. G reco v. Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 26 at 32, 12
N. E. 2d 557 at 560 (1938). The cause of action is one entirely independent
from any that the deceased may have had. It is given to a representative of the
decedents estate as trustee to recover damages suffered by the surviving spouse
and next of kin, because of the death of the deceased. Greco v. Kresge Co., supra.
The first section of wrongful death acts usually provide for liability not-
withstanding the death of the injured person. The second section of the act
provides that the action shall be brought in the name of a personal representative
of the deceased, and the amount recovered shall be for the exclusive benefit of the
widow and next of kin of the deceased, and that the jury may give such damages
and compensation as "they deem fair. See, N. Y. Decedent Estate Law §130.
The provision limiting the death action to those cases when the deceased
might have recovered damages had he lived is the crucial section in the instant
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case, and it is necessary to examine its treatment by the courts. In the following
cases recovery was denied: where decedent assumed the risk, McAdams v. Wind-
ham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742 (1922); where deceased was contributorily negli-
gent, Carran v. Warren Chemical Co., 36 N. Y. 153 (1867); where deceased
recovered for the tort before his death, Littlewood v. City of New York, 89 N. Y.
24 (1882); where defendant acted in self-defense, Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v.
Tindall, 13 Ind. 366, 74 Am. Dec. 259 (1859); where the act of the defendant
was not the proximate cause of the death, Osborne v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Co., 121 W. Va. 357, 3 S. . 2d 527 (1939); where defendant obtained
a release from decedent before the death, Cogswell v. Boston & M. R.R., 78 N. H.
379, 101 Atl 145 (1917); where the statute of limitations had run before the
death, Kelliher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry. Co., 212 N. Y. 207, 105 N. E. 824
(1914); where defendant acted to protect his property, Suell v. Derricott, 161
ALa. 259, 49 So. 895 (1909); and where deceased consented to the act, Newton
V. Illinois Oil Co., 316 11 416, 147 N. E. 465 (1925).
The above decisions make it clear that a wrongful death action cannot be
maintained if the elements of the tort are not present or if the tort is justified.
However there is a conflict as to whether a wrongful death action can be main-
tained where the disability on the part of the deceased goes to his identity as a
party plaintiff rather than to the elements of the cause of action. The problem
most often arises in states where spouses are under a disability to sue one another.
The majority of the decisions hold that where the deceased would be unable to sue
because local law bars a suit between husband and wife, the disability will extend
to the decedent's representative. Hovey v. Dolmage, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N. W.
553 (1927); Dishon's Adm'r. v. Dishon's Admr., 187 Ky. 497, 219 S. W. 794
(1920); Demos v. Freemas, 43 Ohio App. 426, 183 N. E. 395 (1931); Wilson
v. Barton, 153 Tenn. 250, 283 S. W. 71 (1925); Wilson v. Brown, 154 S. W.
322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Keister Adm'r. v. Keister Exr's., 123 Va. 157, 96
S. E. 315 (1918). The rapidly growing minority view, Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho
534, 148 P. 2d 221 (1944); Robins6n's Adm'r. v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 220
S. W. 1074 (1920); Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson,
-Miss. ,'54 So. 2d 476 (1951), points out that the reason for the
disability is the preservation of domestic peace and of the family unity, Wick '.
Wick, 192 Wisc. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927), and that this reason fails to exist
on the death of one or both of the spouses. KaCzorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa.
438, 184 Ad. 663 (1936); Prosser on Torts p. 967 (1941).
In many jurisdictions the problem of the principal case has been eliminated
by legislation which removes the disability of spouses to sue each other in tort.
See, N. Y. Domestic Relations law §57. Although Illinois has not abrogated
the common law disability, the Illinois court has wisely limited its application to
situations for which it is designed to operate, namely in tort actions between
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living spouses. Where one or both of the spouses are dead the reason for the
rule no longer exists, and where the reason does not exist, the rule should not
be applied.
Ralph L. Halpern
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS-SUBSTANTIVE LIABILITY NOT
AFFECTED BY STATUTE
Plaintiff brought an action against the National Maritime Union under General
Associations Law section 13 by naming the president and treasurer of the union
as defendants. The complaint alleged publication of a libel in the official union
newspaper; that the newspaper was under the direction and control of the union
officers; that the libel was published in pursuit of the objectives of the union; and
that the officers were acting in the course of, and within the scope of their
employment. HELD (4-3): the complaint was defective, section 13 requires
pleading and proof of actual authorization or ratification of the act complained of
by all the members. Martin v. Curran, 303 N. Y. 276, 101 N. E. 2d 683 (1951).
Under Common Law an unincorporated association is not capable of suing
or being sued in its common or association, name. .Unlike a corporation, it is not
an artificial person and it has no existence apart from its members. Ostrom v.
Greene, 161 N. Y. 353 55 N. E. 919 (1900); Brown v. The Protestant Episcopal
Church in the United States of America, 8 F. 2d 149 (E. D. La. 1925); See note,
149 A. L IL 510. Nor is it a partnership; the distinction being that a partner-
ship is organized for acquisition of monetary gain, whereas a voluntary association
is organized for moral, benevolent, social, or political purposes. Lafonde v.
Deems, 81 N. Y. 508, (1880). For that reason no authority to create personal
liability is implied or presumed' from the mere fact of membership. A member
is liable for acts done in the name of the association only on a strict agency
theory; i.e., actual consent to, or ratification of the act. Gilmore, Partnership 44
(1911); Mechem, Elements of Partnership 14 (2d ed. 1920).
Although the legal status of unincorporated associations has not been changed,
the modern view is that for some purposes they must be treated as juristic
entities, capable of suing or being sued in the association name. Stevens, Private
Corporations, 40 (2d ed. 1949) In England, labor unions were given the
capacity to sue and be sued in their registered name by the Trade Union Acts of
1871 and 1876. Taff Vale Railway Co., v. Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants, (1901) A. C. 426. In this country federal legislation characterizing
labor unions as entities was the basis for the decision in United Mine Workers
v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L Ed. 975, (1922),
